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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the secrecy capacity of a
wiretap channel in the presence of causal state information and
secure rate-limited feedback. In this scenario, the causal state
information from the channel is available to both the legitimate
transmitter and the legitimate receiver. In addition, the legiti-
mate receiver can send secure feedback to the transmitter at a
limited rate Rf .
We derive upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity
and show that, when the channel to the eavesdropper is degraded,
the bounds are tight and the secrecy capacity is completely
characterised.
The capacity achieving scheme is based on Wyner, Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner wiretap coding and two steps of shared-key generation:
one from the state information and one via the noiseless
feedback. The upper bound is more involved and requires a
non-trivial recursive lemma extending previous results in the
literature to include both state and feedback. We conclude the
paper by showing that a few interesting known results can be
seen as special cases of the above, especially the case where
the state information is available only at the decoder, and the
suggested scheme achieves the secrecy capacity without a source
of randomness at the decoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing demand for network connectivity and high
data rates dictate efficient utilization of resources, such as the
sharing of a common medium for communication. However,
in many practical applications, it is important to assure privacy
is not compromised. In some systems, cryptographic schemes
can be used to protect data from eavesdropping. Yet, these
schemes usually involve a computational burden. Information
theoretic security, on the other hand, offers privacy at the
price of transmission rate.
A canonical model in the context of channel coding was
given by Wyner in [1]. Therein, the wiretap channel, described
in Figure 1, was introduced. In a wiretap channel, Bob
receives the transmitted message of Alice via a channel C1,
called the main channel. The eavesdropper Eve, however,
observes the information transmitted by Alice through the
wiretap channel, C2. The legitimate parties wish to com-
municate through C1 while concealing the information from
Eve. Specifically, Alice wishes to encode its message M and
transmit a codeword Xn on the channel C1. Bob receives Y n,
while Eve receives Zn. The legitimate pair’s objectives are
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Fig. 1. Discrete Memoryless Wiretap Channel (DMWTC).
security, that is, Zn should provide no information about M
(more precisely, 1nI(M ;Z) → 0 as n → ∞), and reliability,
that is, M should be decoded from Y n with a negligibly small
probability of error. The maximal rate 1n logM at which both
objectives can be fulfilled is called the secrecy capacity.
For a physically degraded wiretap channel, i.e., when
p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|y), Wyner showed that the secrecy
capacity is
Cs = max
p(x)
{I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)}. (1)
This result was later extended by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in
[2], which considered broadcast channels with confidential
messages. A special case of the results therein is the secrecy
capacity of the general wiretap channel p(y, z|x), namely,
Cs = max
p(u,x)
{I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)},
with an auxiliary U whose cardinality is bounded by that of
X . Of course, this reduces to (1) when the wiretap channel
is degraded. In fact, it suffices that the main channel is more
capable, that is I(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Z) for any p(x), for the
Wyner result in (1) to hold. An important concept in the
achieveability of the above results is the added randomness,
used to confuse the eavesdropper regarding the actual message
sent. Such randomness will play a key role in this paper as
well.
The current literature includes several generalizations of
the canonical models given in [1] and [2]. We include here
only the most relevant. A thorough discussion of related
works is given in Section III. In [3], Ahlswede and Cai
considered a discrete memoryless wiretap channel with secure
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Fig. 2. The setting considered in this paper. On top of the Wyner wiretap
model, a feedback link is available from the legitimate receiver to the
transmitter. Moreover, the state information at the main channel is available
causally to the legitimate parties. Both the main channel and the wiretap
channel are DMCs.
output feedback. A general feedback link was considered by
Ardestanizadeh et al. in [4]. Therein, since the feedback was
not limited to merely pass the output symbols Y n, the authors
showed that it is beneficial to use the feedback to send fresh
randomness, to be used as a shared key between Alice and
Bob.
In [5], Liu and Chen considered a wiretap model where
the main channel is a state-dependent DMC. While the eaves-
dropper remains ignorant of the state, the authors considered
the cases where the transmitter and legitimate receiver may or
may not have non-causal knowledge of the state. The closely
related problem of secret key agreement in the wiretap channel
with non-causal state information was considered in [6]. The
work in [5] was later extended by Chia and El Gamal in [7]
to the case where causal state information is available (i.e.,
only past and current state values are given). At the heart of
Chia and El Gamal’s methods stands a key generation scheme.
Again, this key, shared by Alice and Bob, is used to increase
the secrecy capacity. The works in [5]–[7], however, do not
include a feedback link.
Main Contribution
In this work, we consider the system depicted in Figure 2.
In this setting, both channel state information (CSI) denoted
as Si and a rate limited feedback denoted as Rf are available.
We derive upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity,
and show that when the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded,
namely, p(y, z|x, s) = p(y|x, s)p(z|y), the bounds are tight
and describe the secrecy capacity exactly. In the lower bound,
we show that a combined scheme of both types of key
generation is required to achieve the results: on top of the
Wyner scheme, one has to create a shared key from the state
information and send an additional key through the feedback.
The main contribution is in the upper bound, which is more
involved, and requires showing that indeed such a use of
the feedback link is optimal. We prove the upper bound via
a non-trivial recursive lemma, which enables us to include
both state and feedback. The resulting region reduces to
previously known results in the literature when the feedback
or state information are not available, and thus extends them.
When the state information is available only at the legitimate
decoder, the state information can be viewed as part of the
channel output, hence the framework of [4] applies. However,
a comparison of achievable schemes suggests that, unlike
what [4] suggests, one should not use the feedback to send
fresh randomness, but might as well losslessly describe the
state to the transmitter, avoiding the need for randomness at
the decoder.
Applications of the above results include, but are not
limited to, cases where the eavesdropper channel is not
weaker than the main channel, yet, one can achieve secure
communication via channel state and feedback, extending the
range of scenarios where information theoretic security can
be used. Moreover, a deep understanding of the capacity of
the wiretap channel under diverse conditions such as state
information and feedback will facilitate the application of
such physical layer security concepts to modern, real word
networks, where state information and feedback are available
(through estimation or two way communication), but to date,
are not used at their full potential.
The structure of this work is as follows. In Section II, the
problem is formally described. In Section III, we summarize
the related work. Section IV includes our main results, with
the lower bound proved in Section V and the upper bound
in Section VI. Section VII includes a description of a few
important special cases. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the Discrete Memoryless Wiretap Channel
(DMWTC) with secure rate limited feedback and causal state
information given in Figure 2. Both Alice, the encoder, and
Bob, the decoder, have access to the state information Si. In
general, the state information can be available non-causally
or causally. In this paper, we focus on the causal case. Alice
desire is keeping Eve ignorant of the confidential message,
denoted as M ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR}, sent to Bob.
Throughout the paper, capital letters denote random vari-
ables, lower case letters denote their realizations, and calli-
graphic letters denote the alphabet. Thus, the sent message
is (X1, . . . , Xn) = Xn, X ∈ X , the output at the legitimate
receiver is Y n, Y ∈ Y , and the output at the eavesdropper is
Zn, Z ∈ Z . The main channel is affected by a memoryless
state sequence Sn, S ∈ S, known causally to both the encoder
and the legitimate decoder. We assume a memoryless channel,
that is,
p(yi, zi|xi, yi−1, zi−1, si) = p(yi, zi|xi, si).
In the case where just the main channel is affected by the
state information, the cross-over probabilities at the wiretap
channel is p(zi|xi, zi−1) = p(zi|xi).
We assume a rate-limited feedback at rate Rf is available
from the decoder to the encoder. That is, symbols Kfi ,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are sent over a feedback link, secretly from
the eavesdropper. The feedback alphabets are denoted as
{Kf1 , . . . ,Kfn}. Thus, their cardinalities must satisfy
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(|Kfi |) ≤ Rf . (2)
3The symbol Kfi at instant i may depend on prior outputs up
to instant i − 1 of the channel, Y i−1 = (Y1, . . . Yi−1) and
the prior symbols (Kf1 , . . .K
f
i−1) = K
i−1
f . Note that, with
a slight misuse of notation, a single instant of the feedback
value at time i is denoted Kfi while the vector (K
f
1 , . . . ,K
f
i )
is denoted Kif . This will remain throughout the paper. We
allow a random feedback, that is, its actual values can depend
on some conditional probability distributions
p(kfi |yi−1, ki−1f ).
Consequently, a code with parameters (2nR, 2nRf , n) for the
wiretap channel in the presence of causal state informa-
tion and rate-limited feedback is defined by a message set
{1, . . . , 2nR}; The conditional probability distributions of the
stochastic coding for the legitimate encoder
p(xi|m,xi−1, si, kif ),
where m denotes the message to be sent; The feedback at rate
Rf defined above and, finally, a decoding map
mˆ : Yn × Sn ×Knf 7→ {1, . . . , 2nR}.
Hence, the decoded message is Mˆ = mˆ(Y n, Sn,Knf ). The
message M at the legitimate encoder is distributed uniformly
on {1, . . . , 2nR}, thus H(M) = nR.
The normalized equivocation at the eavesdropper is the
ratio H(M |Zn)/H(M). Denote the error probability p(Mˆ 6=
M) as P (n)e . We say that the rate/normalized equivocation
tuple (R,Rf , d) is achievable if for any ε > 0 there exists an
(2nR, 2nRf , n) code such that
H(M |Zn)
H(M)
≥ d− ε and P (n)e ≤ ε. (3)
Furthermore, we say the secrecy capacity is Cs if Cs is
the supremum of R in the tuples (R,Rf , 1) satisfying the
inequalities in (3). Namely, tuples where asymptotically, the
eavesdropper is ignorant of the message sent. In this paper,
we focus only on the above case where d = 1, that is, we are
interested in the secrecy capacity Cs.
III. RELATED WORK
The first information theoretic study on the problem of
securely transmitting a message over a public channel was
done in [8]. Therein, Shannon considered the problem of
transmitting a message M from the legitimate sender to the
legitimate receiver via an open channel. Perfect secrecy was
defined by I(M ;X) = 0, where X is the transmitted word.
The result was that the legitimate parties must share a key of
the same length as the message itself in order to achieve such
a strong secrecy requirement. However, as was shown later,
slightly relaxing the perfect secrecy constraint is beneficial.
The wiretap channel in Figurw 1 was presented in [1],
under only an asymptotic independence constraint, requiring
1
nI(M ;Z
n) to vanish. For this channel, one would expect
that when the capacity of the main channel is larger than
that of the wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity will be
positive. Indeed, in [1] Wyner proved that when the wiretap
channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the secrecy
capacity is positive. [2] extended this and concluded that
a positive secrecy capacity is possible whenever the main
channel is less noisy than the wiretap, that is, less noisy than
Z, namely, I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) for any auxiliary U such
that U ↔ X ↔ (Y,Z). Moreover, as was later discussed
in [4], [5], [7], even if the wiretap channel is not degraded,
or less noisy, the secrecy capacity can be positive using state
information. We elaborate on this now.
A. Channel State Information
In [5], a DMWTC with CSI at both ends was discussed.
Specifically, the CSI SN1 was given non-causally at the
encoder while SN2 was given non-causally at the decoder.
The main channel was specified through p(y|x, s1, s2). The
following information rates were defined.
RU1 = I(U ;Y, S2)−max{I(U ;Z), I(U ;S1)},
RU2 = I(U ;Y, S2)− I(U ;S1).
U was an auxiliary random variable and, in addition, a
Markov condition U ↔ (X,S1, S2) ↔ (Y,Z) must hold.
It was shown that the set
Rs =
⋃
U↔(X,S1,S2)↔(Y,Z)
(R, d), (4)
is achievable, under the constraints Rd ≤ RU1 (0 ≤ d ≤ 1)
and 0 ≤ R ≤ RU2. Of special interest to us is the case where
d = 1 and we have
R ≤ max
U↔(X,S1,S2)↔(Y,Z)
min{RU1, RU2}.
This is an achievable rate for the wiretap channel with two-
sided non-causal state information. Moreover, when the state
information is available only at the receiver, that is S1 = ∅
and S2 = S, we have
RU1 = I(U ;Y, S)− I(U ;Z),
RU2 = I(U ;Y, S).
In a recent paper [7], Chia and El-Gamal considered a
similar setting, yet with causal state information. As men-
tioned, at the heart of the scheme is a key generation step.
In particular, random binning of the state sequence known to
both the encoder and decoder gives rise to a shared key. This
key is used to encrypt part of the message. The achievable
scheme results in higher rates compared to [5]. In particular,
they established that
CS ≥ max{ max
p(u|s)p(x|u,s)
min{I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S)
+H(S|Z), I(U ;Y |S)},
max
p(u)p(x|u,s)
min{H(S|Z,U), I(U ;Y |S)}}. (5)
When Y is less noisy than Z, namely, I(U ;Y |S) ≥
I(U ;Z|S) for any auxiliary U such that (U, S)↔ (X,S)↔
(Y,Z), this results in
CS = max
p(x|s)
min{I(X;Y |S)− I(X;Z|S) +H(S|Z),
I(X;Y |S)}.
4Specific results for the Gaussian channel were given in
[9] and in [10] for a Gaussian channel with state. Secret
agreement schemes for channels with state known at the
transmitter were given in [6]. Of course, CSI plays a key
role in MIMO-Wiretap channels as well. Secrecy capacity
(and in particular, outage) was discussed in [11], where it
was shown that one can take the advantage of having perfect
knowledge of the channel state to the legitimate receiver by
adding artificial noise to the null space of the main channel.
Later results regarding the optimal beamforming vectors can
be found in [12]. The advantage of perfect knowledge of
the channel state to the legitimate receiver was also used in
[13] under a Rician fading setting. Fading channels in the
context of OFDM were considered in [14]. Finally, the current
literature also includes work on active eavesdropping in the
presence of channel state [15].
B. Feedback
In this work, besides state information, we are interested
in the availability of noiseless feedback as well. Interactions
in secure duplex communication can benefit from the insights
of such models. Indeed, we will establish that in the case of
wiretap channels with CSI, feedback can increase the secrecy
capacity significantly.
In [3], the authors characterized the capacity of a wiretap
channel with noiseless feedback of the channel output, and
showed that in this case,
Cs = max
p(x)
min{I(X;Y |Z) +H(Y |X,Z), I(X;Y )}. (6)
This is exactly the capacity when one extracts a key from the
feedback (as feedback does not increase capacity otherwise).
In [4], the authors investigated the secrecy capacity
Cs(Rf ) of a wiretap channel where the legitimate parties
have a secure link (feedback) from the decoder to the encoder
at rate Rf . Note that the feedback was not limited to carry
output symbols. The upper bound in [4] was
Cs(Rf ) ≤ max
p(x)
min{I(X;Y |Z) +Rf , I(X;Y )}. (7)
Again, when the wiretap channel is physically degraded, the
upper bound is tight, establishing (7) as the secrecy capacity.
C. Secret Key Agreement, Networks and Practical Schemes
A closely related set of problems fall under secret key
agreement schemes [16]–[18]. In these problems, one is
interested in the number of secret bits which can be distilled
in a system. In fact, it is not hard to see that any wiretap
coding scheme is also a secret key agreement scheme, hence
the secret key capacity is an upper bound on the secrecy rate.
However, it is tight only in specific cases (e.g., [19, Example
4.7]). The difference stems from the fact that the underlying
metric is different (number of secret bits distilled versus
number of bits transmitted securely). Moreover, many secret
key agreement schemes allow public information exchanges
between Alice and Bob (on top of the main channel or the
correlated sources available to them). To the best of our
knowledge, there are no concrete results from the literature
on secret key capacity which, for the problem at hand, give
tighter bounds than the ones we give in the paper.
The theory and practice of wiretap channel coding has been
found useful in a variety of networking scenarios as well.
E.g., in [20], the authors suggested a client-server setting
where the binary erasure wiretap channel approach was found
constructive. A multitude of network coding scenarios exist
in [21], [22].
Finally, we mention that the current literature includes
practical coding schemes as well, rendering them as desirable
solutions for physical layer security. LDPC for the Gaussian
wiretap channel was suggested in [23], as well as in [24]
to suggest secret sharing schemes. LDPCs were also used to
allow strong secrecy over a binary erasure channel in [25].
IV. MAIN RESULTS
We list the main results of the paper, and conclude with
an illustrative example. The proofs are deferred to Sections
V and VI.
A. Lower Bound
The achievability part is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume a DMWTC, with causal CSI given at
the encoder and the legitimate decoder and in the presence
of rate limited feedback. Then, the secrecy capacity is lower
bounded by
CS ≥ max{ max
p(u|s)p(x|u,s)
min{I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S)
+H(S|Z) +Rf , I(U ;Y |S)},
max
p(u)p(x|u,s)
min{H(S|Z,U) +Rf , I(U ;Y |S)}},
where U is an auxiliary random variable and the distributions
p(u|s) and p(x|u, s) can be optimized.
Theorem 1 proves that the secrecy capacity is dictated by
the following three rates:
Rˆ1 = I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z) +Rf ,
Rˆ2 = I(U ;Y, S)− I(U ;S) = I(U ;Y |S),
Rˆ3 = H(S|Z,U) +Rf .
Note that Rˆ3 is the maximal rate at which a key can be
extracted and used to secure the communication. Clearly, up
to this rate, there is no need in Wyner-like wiretap coding, and
the message can be protected solely by the key. On the other
hand, Rˆ2 is the capacity of the main channel. This bound
certainly cannot be exceeded. Between these two bounds,
Wyner-like coding is beneficial, and the resulting secrecy rate
will be Rˆ1, which is the most interesting constraint.
The achievability, while based on extracting a key from
the side information sequence similar to [7], involves both
Wyner-like wiretap coding and two levels of protection using
secret keys: one extracted from the CSI and one transmitted
through the feedback. Hence, a message is divided into three
sub-messages, which should not leak to the eavesdropper.
However, as feedback introduces memory, a key challenge is
in proving a corresponding upper bound.
5B. Upper Bound
The upper bound is the following.
Theorem 2. Assume a DMWTC, with causal CSI given at
the encoder and the legitimate decoder and in the presence
of rate limited feedback. Then, the secrecy capacity is upper
bounded by
CS ≤ max
p(x|s)
min{I(X;Y |Z, S)
+H(S|Z) +Rf , I(X;Y |S)}.
The availability of a rate-limited feedback complicates the
converse as it renders many of the tools used for memoryless
channels impractical. Specifically, in the presence of feedback,
p(yn, zn|xn, sn) no longer has a simple product form. Thus,
the proof of the converse involves a non-trivial generalization
of a recursive lemma from [4], which incorporates both state
information and feedback.
C. Complete Characterization of the Secrecy Capacity
It is interesting to investigate the cases where the lower
and upper bounds match. As for the lower bound, when
Rˆ1 ≥ Rˆ3 and the main channel is less noisy than the
eavesdropper channel, with the data processing inequality
I(U ;Y |S) ≤ I(X;Y |S) the bound sums up to
CS ≥ max
p(x|s)
{I(X;Y |S)− I(X;Z|S) +H(S|Z) +Rf} .
Note that the less noisy assumption is weaker than the
degraded assumption, hence the result holds in this case as
well. Now, when the eavesdropper channel is degraded such
that p(y, z|x, s) = p(y|x, s)p(z|y) and (X,S) ↔ Y ↔ Z
from a Markov chain, the upper bound on the secrecy capacity
reduces to
CS ≤ max
p(x|s)
{I(X;Y |S)− I(X;Z|S) +H(S|Z) +Rf}
and the bounds match.
Corollary 1. Assume a DMWTC, with causal CSI given at the
encoder and the legitimate decoder and in the presence of rate
limited feedback. If the eavesdropper channel is degraded,
then the secrecy capacity is
CS = max
p(x|s)
min{I(X;Y |S)− I(X;Z|S)
+H(S|Z) +Rf , I(X;Y |S)}.
D. Example
We compare several scenarios for a degraded binary sym-
metric wiretap channel, where the scenarios differ by the
availability of channel state and noiseless feedback.
A degraded DMWTC with noiseless feedback and without
CSI is given in Figure 3 A. The main channel between Alice
and Bob is a binary symmetric channel with a transition
probability py . That is,
py|x(0|0) = 1− py, py|x(0|1) = py
py|x(1|1) = 1− py, py|x(1|0) = py.
We denote this channel model by BSC(py). The wiretap
channel is realized by cascading the main binary symmetric
channel, BSC(py), and the eavesdropper’s binary symmetric
channel, BSC(pz).
A degraded wiretap channel with noiseless feedback and
CSI is shown in Figure 3 B. Now, the main BSC is state-
dependent, that is, it is BSC(psi) if the state at time i
is si. The wiretap channel is a cascade of this channel
and BSC(pz). The maximum of CNSs (Rf ) (over the input
distribution), i.e., the capacity of the degraded DMWTC
without CSI yet with feedback, and the maximum of CSs (Rf ),
i.e., the capacity of the degraded DMWTC with CSI and
feedback, are both achieved using a symmetric input prob-
ability distribution, namely, P (X = 0) = P (X = 1) = 0.5.
Thus, X , Y and Z are uniformly distributed over {0, 1}.
The binary entropy function and the binary convolution are
denoted by h(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) and by
py ∗ pz = py(1 − pz) + (1 − py)pz , respectively. With these
distributions, without state information (case A) the mutual
information is
I(X;Y ) = 1− h(py),
hence the relevant capacity is
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) = h(py ∗ pz)− h(py).
Now, assume the main channel has state (Case B). We assume
only two states are possible, and each state corresponds to a
different cross over probability in the main channel. That is,
assume P (S = s0) = 1 − q and P (S = s1) = q. When
S = s0, py|x,s(y|x, 0) = 1− ps0 if x = y and ps0 otherwise.
When S = s1, py|x,s(y|x, 1) = 1 − ps1 if x = y and ps1
otherwise. Hence, for the case with state information, we have
I(X;Y |S) = 1− (1− q)h(ps0)− qh(ps1).
Furthermore, with the symmetric input distribution as in this
example, it is not hard to verify that I(Z;S) = 0. Thus,
H(S|Z) = H(S) = h(q).
As for the wiretap channel, we have
I(X;Z|S) = 1− (1− q)h(ps0 ∗ pz)− qh(ps1 ∗ pz).
Hence,
I(X;Y |S)− I(X;Z|S) +H(S|Z)
=1− (1− q)h(ps0)− qh(ps1)
− {1− qh(ps1 ∗ pz)− (1− q)h(ps0 ∗ pz)}
+ h(q)
=(1− q)h(ps0 ∗ pz) + qh(ps1 ∗ pz)
− (1− q)h(ps0)− qh(ps1) + h(q).
As a result, the capacities to compare are
CNSs (Rf ) = min{1− h(py), h(py ∗ pz)− h(py) +Rf}
and
CSs (Rf ) = min{1− (1− q)h(ps0)− qh(ps1),
(1− q)h(ps0 ∗ pz) + qh(ps1 ∗ pz)
− (1− q)h(ps0)− qh(ps1) + h(q) +Rf}.
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Fig. 3. (A) Degraded wiretap channel without causal CSI, (B) Degraded
wiretap channel with causal CSI.
Numerical results for the capacities above are given in
Figures 4 and 5. The cross-over probabilities are fixed on
pz = py = 0.1, ps0 = 0.05 and ps1 = 0.15. 4 gives
the capacities CNSs (Rf ) and C
S
s (Rf ) versus Rf . The same
saturation phenomenon observed with no state is visible with
state as well (with linear increase until the saturation point),
however, it is clear that the probabilities for each state affect
the capacity. This effect is, in fact, twofold. First, the value of
the state affects the capacity of the direct channel. Yet, besides
this effect, the fact that there is a state sequence affects the
secrecy capacity. The more entropy the state sequence has,
the higher the key rate, hence the faster the capacity saturates
at its maximal value (which is the main channel capacity). 5
gives another perspective, plotting the secrecy capacities as
a function of q. It is clear that once the capacities saturate,
the value is independent of Rf . It decreases with q, though
the higher q is the lower is the capacity of the direct channel.
This is only due to the specific choices of ps0 and ps1 .
V. LOWER BOUND
A. Achievability of Rˆ1
Consider Rˆ1, with the maximization on the input distribu-
tion:
Rˆ1 = max
p(u|s)p(x|u,s)
{I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S)
+H(S|Z) +Rf}.
Similar to [7], we perform the maximization in Rˆ1 through
distributions p(u′), p(x|u, s) and functions of the form
u(u′, s), using the functional representation lemma [26].
This way, the achievability can be proved for an equivalent
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Fig. 4. The secrecy capacities CNSs (Rf ) and C
S
s (Rf ) versus Rf , with
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amount of randomness in the key suffices to saturate the secrecy capacity
regardless of the value of Rf . For lower q, however, there is not enough
randomness in the key generated from the state, and the capacity saturates
only for non-zero values of Rf .
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Fig. 5. The secrecy capacities, this time as a function of the state
probabilities, that is, CNSs (q) and C
S
s (q). For low values of q, the key
factor in the secrecy capacity is the amount of randomness in the state
sequence. Hence, in this range, the higher q is, the higher the secrecy capacity.
However, when the secrecy capacity saturates, due to the specific choices of
probabilities ps0 and ps1 , the higher q is, lower the main channel capacity,
hence the secrecy capacity decreases.
characterization of Rˆ1,
max
p(u′),u(u′,s),p(x|u,s)
{I(U ′;Y, S)− I(U ′;Z, S)
+H(S|Z) +Rf}.
We split the proof to two cases, the first is when
I(U ′;Y, S) ≥ I(U ′;Z, S), where for this case (U ′, S) ↔
(X,S) ↔ (Y, Z) from a Markov chain, and the second case
is when I(U ′;Y, S) ≤ I(U ′;Z, S).
1) First Case - I(U ′;Y, S) ≥ I(U ′;Z, S):
7a) Encoding of Legitimate Sender (Alice): The encoding
scheme in this case requires the transmission of B − 1
protected blocks during the transmission of B blocks, each of
length n. The message in the first block is not fully protected.
Given a distribution PU ′ and a function u(u′, s), we set the
following three rates:
R0 = I(U
′;Y, S)− I(U ′;Z, S)− 2,
R1 = H(S|Z)− ,
R2 = Rf .
The coding scheme corresponds to a transmission rate
R = R0 +R1 +R2 = Rˆ1 − 3,
secretly from the eavesdropper. We assume R ≤ I(U ′;Y, S).
Of course, this is not an actual restriction as I(U ′;Y, S) ≤
I(U ′;Y |S), which is, in turn, an upper bound on the secrecy
capacity 1 claims is achievable. Hence, cases where R0 +
R1 +R2 > I(U
′;Y, S) are of no interest.
We split the message Mj , j ∈ {2, . . . , B}, into three inde-
pendent messages M0 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR0}, M1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR1}
and M2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR2}. The message at rate R0 will be
protected by the Wyner wiretap coding scheme, while the
messages at rate R1 + R2 will be protected by the keys: a
message at rate R1 protected by the key generated from the
CSI and a message at rate R2 protected by the key received
from the feedback.
The first step is the generation of the message codebook.
We randomly generate 2n[I(U
′;Y,S)−] i.i.d. sequences u′n(l),
using the distribution P (U ′n = u′i) =
∏n
i=1 PU ′(u
′
i). Then,
these sequences are distributed randomly into 2nR0 equal size
bins. The index of each bin is denoted as j ∈ {1, 2, . . . J =
2nR0}. Next, these sequences are distributed randomly into
2nR1 sub-bins, and we further partition each sub-bin to 2nR2
equal size sub-bins. Denote the resulting bin indices by
C(m0,m1,m2).
Next we create the keys from the CSI. We bin the channel
state sequences sn at random into 2nR1 bins {B(ks)}2nR1ks=1.
The key KSj−1 used to protect M
1 in block j is the bin index
of the state sequence Sn(j − 1) in block j − 1.
The third step is the generation of the feedback codebook.
Similar to [4], it is used solely to give the encoder random bits.
Herein, however, such random bits are sent for each block.
The key is of rate R2, i.e., Bob sends k
f
j drawn uniformly
from 2nR2 indices to be used in the jth block. This key is
the one used to encrypt M2 of the given block.
To encode the first block of the message M1, given M01 ,
M11 and M
2
1 , the encoder selects a random codeword u
′n(L)
from C(M01 ,M
1
1 ,M
2
1 ). Then it computes ui = u(u
′
i(L), si)
and the symbol transmitted is a random one, according to
Xi ∼ p(xi|si, ui) for i ∈ {1 . . . n}. Note that the first block is
not protected by the keys. However, during the transmission
of the j − 1 block, the encoder (Alice) gathers two keys,
ksj−1 from the state sequence and k
f
j−1 from the feedback.
To encode the j-th block of the message Mj , j ∈ {2, . . . , B},
given M0j , M
1
j and M
2
j , the encoder selects a random code-
word u′n(L) from C(M0j ,M
1
j ⊕ksj−1,M2j ⊕kfj−1). ⊕ denotes
modulo-[2R1 ] and [2R2 ] additions. It then computes ui =
u(u′i(L), s1i) and the symbol transmitted is, again, random,
according to Xi ∼ p(xi|si, ui) for i ∈ {(j − 1)n+ 1 . . . jn}.
Note that M0, similar to [7], is protected using the
Wyner coding scheme, therefore the eavesdropper cannot
comprehend this part from the message when I(U ′;Y, S1)−
I(U ′;Z, S2) > 0. The second part, M1, is encrypted with the
key ksj−1 and the third part, M
2, is encrypted with the key
kfj−1.
b) Decoding at legitimate receiver (Bob): The decoding
involves standard joint typicality arguments. We list here only
the most important steps.
In the first block the legitimate receiver searches for a word
u′n(L) in the codebook, such that (u′n(l), yn(j), sn(j)) is
jointly typical, then the legitimate receiver (Bob) declares
the index of the bin containing this u′n(l) as the message
received.
As the number of originally drawn sequences,
2n[I(U
′;Y,S)−], is similar to that in [7], the analysis of
the error probability is similar, and the jointly typical u′n(l)
is identified with high probability. The probability that a
different sequence is identified is arbitrarily close to zero.
Thus, the message indices m0j ,m
1
j and m
2
j are decoded
correctly with high probability.
As for the decoding at the j-th block j ∈ {2, . . . , B},
the decoder uses a similar procedure to retrieve m0j , m
1
j ⊕
ksj−1 and m
2
j ⊕ kfj−1. It then uses ksj−1 to retrieve m1j
and kfj−1 to retrieve m
2
j . It is easy to verify that a rate
Rˆ1 = min{I(U ′;Y |S) − I(U ′;Z|S) + H(S|Z) + R(f) −
δn, I(U
′;Y |S)} can be achieved.
c) Information Leakage at the Eavesdropper (Eve):
For j ∈ {1, . . . , B} we let Znj denote the eavesdropper’s
observation in block j. The information leaked L(C˜nB), given
the codebook and coding procedure C˜nB is then
1
nB
L(C˜nB) =
1
nB
I(M01 . . .M
0
BM
1
1 . . .M
1
B
M21 . . .M
2
B ;Z
n
1 . . . Z
n
B |C˜nB)
=
1
nB
I(M01 . . .M
0
BM
1
1 . . .M
1
B ;Z
n
1 . . . Z
n
B |C˜nB)
+
1
nB
I(M21 . . .M
2
B ;Z
n
1 . . . Z
n
B
|M01 . . .M0BM11 . . .M1B , C˜nB)
(8)
where the equality is due to the chain rule for mutual
information. We now consider the two summands. As for the
first, this is exactly the information leakage on the messages
protected by the Wyner wiretap scheme and the messages
protected by the key drawn from the state sequence. Hence, by
the results of Chia and El Gamal [7], specifically, Proposition
1 therein and the discussion which follows, as long as the key
extracted from the state is at rate smaller than H(S|Z), Eve’s
knowledge on the key is negligible, hence the first summand
is negligible.
Consider the second summand. {M2j } are the portions of
the messages protected by the keys received from the feedback.
8The keys sent through the feedback are random, indepen-
dent of all other variables in our problem. Remember that
the encoder selects a random codeword from C(M0j ,M
1
j ⊕
ksj−1,M
2
j ⊕ kfj−1). Thus, the actually transmitted codewords
(at all blocks), and, of course, the received ones at Eve’s side
may depend on M2j only through M
2
j ⊕kfj−1, that is, they are
completely independent of M2j unless the key is given. Due
to the above, the second summand is zero. In other words, if
one considers M21 . . .M
2
B as a single message at rate BR2
and Zn1 . . . Z
n
B as an output block of size Bn, the second
summand is equivalent to the expression I(M2;Zn|C,M1)
that appears in [4, equation (45)], which is shown to be zero
therein. We conclude that Rˆ1 is achievable.
2) Second Case - I(U ′;Y, S) ≤ I(U ′;Z, S): Herein, the
main channel capacity is too low, and the encoder cannot
use the Wyner wiretap scheme to secretly send message to
the legitimate receiver. Therefore, only the two keys, the one
resulting from the CSI and the one resulting from the feedback
can be used to protect the message. We only consider the
scenario where (I(U ′;Y |S)−I(U ′;Z|S))+(H(S|Z)+Rf ) >
0. Otherwise the secrecy capacity is zero.
The same key splitting as in [7] is used. In short, in
the block j ∈ {2 . . . B}, we split the message to three
parts as before, yet protect the first two with the state key.
The state information key ksj−1 is split to two independent
parts, ks(j−1,0) and k
s
(j−1,1) at rates which coincides with
case 2 of RS−CSI−1 in [7]. Thus, compared with the first
case of Rˆ1, to send message Mj , j ∈ {2 . . . B}, transmit
Xn(ks(j−1,0),M
1
j ⊕ks(j−1,1),M2j ⊕kfj−1) ∈ Cn. The reminder
of the proof is very similar to [7].
B. Achievability of Rˆ3
In this case, to encode the message we use purely the
key Ks in the block, which coincides with RS−CSI−2 in
Chia and El Gamal [7, Theorem 1]. We split the mes-
sage Mj , j ∈ {2, . . . , B}, into two independent messages
M1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR1} and M2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR2}, where
R ≥ R1 + R2 and I(U ′;Y, S) − 3 > R, such that
to send message Mj , j ∈ {2 . . . B} given M1j and M2j
transmit Xn(M1j ⊕ ksj−1,M2j ⊕ kfj−1) ∈ Cn using Shannon’s
strategy [8] (one-time pad). The decoder uses joint typicality
decoding together with the knowledge of the keys and the
state information to decode message Mˆj .
VI. UPPER BOUND
Assume n, δn → 0 when n → ∞. Consider first the two
upper bounds, when the CSI is available at both transmitter
and legitimate receiver, and a feedback at rate Rf is present,
R ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|Si) + n (9)
and
R ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|Zi, Si) + 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Zi)
+Rf + δn. (10)
The upper bound in (9) is since the secrecy capacity cannot
be greater than the channel capacity. Thus, 2 follows by
combining (9) and (10), then introducing a time sharing
random variable [27] to show that the secrecy capacity must
satisfy
R ≤ max
p(x|s)
min{I(X;Y |S), I(X;Y |Z, S)
+H(S|Z) +Rf}. (11)
We now continue similar to [4] using Fano’s inequality,
the fact that Ln → 0 (the constraint on the secrecy) and the
fact that 1n
∑n
i=1 log(|Kfi |) ≤ Rf . Together with 1 below, a
non-trivial extension of [4, Lemma 1] for a wiretap with state
information, the upper bound in (10) will follow.
By Fano’s inequality, for Mˆ = mˆ(Y n,Knf , S
n),
H(M |Mˆ) ≤ 1 + P (n)e nR = nn,
where n → 0 as n→∞ if P (n)e → 0. Since Mˆ is a function
of Y n,Knf , S
n,
H(M |Y n,Knf , Sn) ≤ H(M |Mˆ)
≤ nn.
Using the secrecy constraint,
I(M ;Zn) = nγn, (12)
where γn → 0 as n→∞. Consequently,
nR = H(M)
= H(M |Zn) + I(M ;Zn)
(a)
= H(M |Zn) + nγn
= I(M ;Y n,Knf , S
n|Zn) +H(M |Y n, Zn, Sn,Knf )
+nγn
= I(M ;Y n,Knf |Zn, Sn) + I(M ;Sn|Zn)
+H(M |Y n, Zn, Sn,Knf ) + nγn
(b)
≤ I(M ;Y n,Knf |Zn, Sn) + I(M ;Sn|Zn)
+nn + nγn
(c)
= I(M ;Knf |Zn, Sn) + I(M ;Y n|Knf , Zn, Sn)
+I(M ;Sn|Zn) + nδn
(d)
≤ H(Knf |Zn, Sn) + I(M,Xn;Y n|Knf , Zn, Sn)
+H(Sn|Zn) + nδn
where (a) follows from (12), (b) follows from Fano’s inequal-
ity, and (c) follows by defining δn = n + γn. The following
recursive lemma is now required.
Lemma 1. For each j ∈ {1, . . . n},
H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj ;Y j |Kjf , Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
≤ H(Kj−1f |Zj−1, Sj−1)+I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) +H(Kfj |M,Xj−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+ I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj).
9Proof: We start with the left hand side in the lemma, and
show that one can indeed decrease j to j − 1 at the price of
the added terms:
H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj ;Y j |Kjf , Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
= H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj ;Y j |Kjf , Zj , Sj)
+H(Sj−1|Zj) +H(Sj |Zj , Sj−1)
≤ H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj ;Y j |Kjf , Zj , Sj)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) +H(Sj |Zj)
= H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj ;Y j−1|Kjf , Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Xj ;Yj |Y j−1,Kjf , Zj , Sj)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) +H(Sj |Zj)
≤ H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj ;Y j−1|Kjf , Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Y j−1,Kjf , Z
j−1, Sj−1, Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) +H(Sj |Zj)
(e)
= H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj ;Y j−1|Kjf , Zj , Sj)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
≤ H(Kjf |Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Xj , Zj , Sj ;Y
j−1|Kjf , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
(f)
= H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj ;Y j−1|Kjf , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
= H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kjf , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+I(Xj ;Y
j−1|M,Xj−1,Kjf , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
(g)
= H(Kjf |Zj , Sj) + I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kjf , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
= H(Kjf |Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Xj−1,Kfj ;Y
j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
−I(Kfj ;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
= H(Kjf |Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+I(Kfj ;Y
j−1|M,Xj−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
−I(Kfj ;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
= H(Kj−1f |Zj , Sj) +H(Kfj |Kj−1f , Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+I(Kfj ;Y
j−1|M,Xj−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Kfj |Y j−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
−H(Kfj |Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
(h)
≤ H(Kj−1f |Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+I(Kfj ;Y
j−1|M,Xj−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Kfj |Y j−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
= H(Kj−1f |Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Kfj |M,Xj−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
−H(Kfj |Y j−1,M,Xj−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Kfj |Y j−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
(i)
= H(Kj−1f |Zj , Sj)
+I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Kfj |M,Xj−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
(j)
≤ H(Kj−1f |Zj−1, Sj−1)
+I(M,Xj−1;Y j−1|Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Kfj |M,Xj−1,Kj−1f , Zj−1, Sj−1)
+H(Sj−1|Zj−1) + I(Xj ;Yj |Zj , Sj) +H(Sj |Zj)
where (e) is due to the Markov chain Yj ↔ (Xj , Zj , Sj) ↔
(M,Xj−1,Kjf , Y
j−1, Zj−1, Sj−1); (f) follows from
(Sj , Zj) ↔ (M,Xj ,Kjf , Zj−1, Sj−1) ↔ Y j−1. (g) is
because Y j−1 ↔ (M,Xj−1,Kjf , Zj−1, Sj−1) ↔ Xj form
a Markov chain. (h) and (j) follow since conditioning
reduces the entropy and (i) is due to the Markov chain
(M,Xj−1)↔ (Zj−1, Y j−1,Kj−1f , Sj−1)↔ Kfj .
To continue, we use Lemma 1 recursively starting from (d):
nR ≤ H(Knf |Zn, Sn) + I(M,Xn;Y n|Knf , Zn, Sn)
+H(Sn|Zn) + nδn
≤ H(Kn−1f |Zn−1, Sn−1)
+I(M,Xn−1;Y n−1|Kn−1f , Zn−1, Sn−1)
+H(Sn−1|Zn−1)
+I(Xn;Yn|Zn, Sn)
+H(Sn|Zn) +H(Kfn) + nδn
≤ H(Kn−2f |Zn−2, Sn−2)
+I(M,Xn−2;Y n−2|Kn−2f , Zn−2, Sn−2)
+H(Sn−2|Zn−2)
+I(Xn−1;Yn−1|Zn−1, Sn−1)
+I(Sn−1|Zn−1) +H(Kfn−1)
+I(Xn;Yn|Zn, Sn)
+H(Sn|Zn) +H(Kfn) + nδn
≤ . . .
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|Zi, Si) +
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Zi)
+
n∑
i=1
H(Kfi ) + nδn.
Thus,
nR ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|Zi, Si) +
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Zi)
+
n∑
i=1
H(Kfi ) + nδn.
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We now normalize by n, and use the constraint
1
n
∑n
i=1 log(|Kfi |) ≤ Rf . We have,
R ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|Zi, Si) + 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Si|Zi) +Rf + δn.
To conclude, the well-known technique of introducing a time
sharing random variable is used. Assume Q is independent of
Xn, Y n, Zn, Sn and uniform on {1, . . . , n}, this results in
R ≤ Rf + 1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Yi|Zi, Si) +H(Si|Zi)) + δn
= Rf +
1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Yi|Zi, Si, Q = i)
+H(Si|Zi, Q = i)) + δn
= Rf + I(XQ;YQ|ZQ, SQ, Q) +H(SQ|ZQ, Q) + δn
= Rf + I(X;Y |Z, S,Q) +H(S|Z,Q) + δn
where X := XQ, Y := YQ, Z := ZQ, S := SQ.
Now, letting n→∞, we get δn → 0 and n → 0, we have
R ≤ Rf + I(X;Y |Z, S,Q) +H(S|Z,Q)
≤ Rf + I(X,Q;Y |Z, S) +H(S,Q|Z)
≤ Rf + I(X;Y |Z, S) +H(S|Z).
Similarly, it is also easy to see that R ≤ I(X;Y |S).
From the two above bounds,
R ≤ min{I(X;Y |S), I(X;Y |Z, S) +H(S|Z) +Rf},
and the theorem easily follows.
VII. SPECIAL CASES
We start with the simple reductions, which show that our
result generalizes known results in the literature, and conclude
with an interesting observation on the case where the CSI is
given only to the legitimate receiver.
A. Degraded Channel with no Dependence on the State
When Z is a degraded1 version of Y and p(y, z|x, s) =
p(y, z|x), we have
CS = max
p(x)
min{I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)+H(S)+Rf , I(X;Y )}.
That is, both S and Rf come into play as keys to increase
the secrecy capacity of the canonical DMWTC. Of course, in
the case there is no state information at all (yet the feedback
is still present), the results coincide with those of [4] (Figure
6). That is, equation (7) and the cases where it is tight.
1Note that [7] lists a few interesting cases for which its bounds are tight.
We do not include this list here, and only referred to the degraded version.
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Fig. 6. DMWTC in the presence of feedback.
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Fig. 7. DMWTC with causal CSI.
B. Less Noisy Eavesdropper
Consider the case where the output of the main channel
is more noisy than the output of the eavesdropper channel
and p(y, z|x, s) = p(y, z|x). That is, I(U ;Z) ≥ I(U ;Y ) for
every U such that U ↔ X ↔ (Y,Z) from a Markov chain.
We have
I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z) ≤ H(S|Z) ≤ H(S).
Consequently, the secrecy capacity of this special class of
channels is
CS = max
p(x)
min{H(S) +Rf , I(X;Y )}.
In this case, there is no benefit in a regular (Wyner-type)
wiretap coding, and secrecy can be achieved only via the
shared keys (up to the main channel capacity).
C. No Feedback
When the causal CSI is provide to the legitimate sender
and legitimate receiver, yet the rate limited feedback is absent,
the results easily reduce to those of Chia and El Gamal [7].
describes this case. The secrecy capacity is lower bounded by
CS ≥ max{ max
p(u|s)p(x|u,s)
min{I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S)
+H(S|Z), I(U ;Y |S)},
max
p(u)p(x|u,s)
min{H(S|Z,U), I(U ;Y |S)}}. (13)
11
fR
iX iY
iZ
iS
M
∧
M
Fig. 8. DMWTC with CSI only at the decoder and in the presence of rate
limited feedback.
D. Causal State Information Only at the Legitimate Decoder
Finally, we consider the following case where the rate
limited feedback is available but the causal CSI is given only
to the legitimate decoder. Figure 8 depicts this scenario. Note
that without the feedback, this case coincides with case 3 in
[5]. However, even with feedback, when the side information
is available only at the decoder, it can be viewed as part
of the output, hence the results of [4] essentially apply with
Y ′ = (Y, S). Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that the
same results can be achieved without sending keys from an
outside source, and, rather, by feeding the state to the encoder.
In particular, consider two possible achievable schemes. The
first is similar to [4], that is, use the feedback solely in order
to send a key to the transmitter, and use this key to encrypt
part of the message. The resulting lower bound is
CS ≥ I(U ;Y, S)− I(U ;Z) +Rf
= I(U ;S) + I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z) +Rf
= I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z) +Rf ,
where, S and U are independent and the joint distribution is
defined as p(s)p(u)p(x|u)p(yz|x, s).
In the second, instead of sending fresh randomness through
the feedback, the decoder sends the state sequence (if the rate
limit permits). Assume for now that Rf = H(S). The encoder
uses this information to both generate a key and optimize the
main channel capacity, as in the proof of the lower bound Rˆ1
when Rf = H(S). In this case, we have
CS ≥ max
p(u|S)
min{I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z),
I(U ;Y |S)}. (14)
We now show that the achievable scheme which results in
(13) is at least as good. We have
I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z) +H(S)
=I(U ;Y |S)−H(Z) +H(Z|U) +H(S)
(a)
= I(U ;Y |S)−H(Z) +H(Z|U, S) +H(S)
=I(U ;Y |S)−H(Z) +H(Z|U, S) +H(S,Z)−H(Z|S)
=I(U ;Y |S)−H(Z|S) +H(Z|U, S) +H(S|Z)
=I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z),
fR
iX iY
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Fig. 9. Wiretap Channel With State Information In The Encoder And Rate
Limited Feedback.
where (a) follows from the Markov chain S ↔ U ↔ Z.
While the two expressions are equal, it is clear that the later
achievability scheme is at least as good as the optimization
is over all possible p(u|s) and not simply p(u). Of course,
since [4] applies here, the benefit can only be in avoiding the
need for an outside source of randomness.
When Rf > H(S), the same scheme can be used, yet, in
addition to sending the state information from the decoder
to the encoder through the secure rate limited feedback, one
can send also a key Kf , with H(Kf ) < Rf − H(S). The
encoding procedure is as in the proof of the lower bound Rˆ1.
For this case, the resulting secrecy capacity is bounded by
CS ≥ max
p(u|s)
min{I(U ;Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S)
+H(S|Z) +H(Kf ), I(U ;Y |S)}.
Note that, as inferred from [3] and re-assured in [4], the best
use of the feedback is in sending a random key, hence, there
is no need to send Y or a compressed version of it in the
extra rate above H(S).
When Rf < H(S), we conjecture that the preferred scheme
is to feedback the compressed state information S′, and use
it to extract common randomness, though, of course, at rate
smaller than H(S).
Finally, note that in the case where there is state information
only at the encoder and, in addition, a secure feedback is
available (Figure 8 ), similar arguments to the one used above
can be used. Thus, we conjecture that by case 4 in [5],
[7], and when adding the secure rate limited feedback, the
resulting bound is
CS ≥ max
p(u,x|s)
min{I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z) +Rf ,
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)}.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Physical layer security promises to achieve secret transmis-
sion at the expense of transmission rate. While several models
in this area, such as the wiretap channel, are well understood,
with both capacity results and practical codes, more complex
scenarios are still unsolved. For example, in order to apply
the concepts of physical layer security to networks with
12
state information and two way communication, the canonical
model of a wiretap channel with state and feedback should
be understood.
In this paper, the wiretap channel with causal state infor-
mation and secure rate limited feedback at the encoder and
legitimate decoder is studied. We established upper and lower
bounds on the secrecy capacity, and proved their tightness in
the case of a less capable eavesdropper. The suggested coding
scheme is based on two steps of key generation, one from
the causal state information and one from fresh randomness
through the rate limited feedback. It was shown that in several
special cases, the results reduce to known expressions in the
literature.
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